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THE UTILITY OF THE CULPABILITY CONCEPT IN
PROMOTING PROPER DRIVING BEHAVIOR*
JAMES C. MANCUSO, PH.D.**
In view of the grip which the automobile holds upon our lives,1
both in terms of personal safety and economic outlay,? personal
moral behavior within the roadway system becomes an extremely
serious topic. Can people be taught to behave in ways that will
reduce tragic and expensive mishaps? Which social institutions and
educational techniques influence a driver to behave appropriately?
Considering the concerted attack on the personal-fault system of
tort liability, shall our society move toward downgrading the con-
cept of personal fault as a behavioral control mechanism?
Having consulted a team of experts on behavioral deviance in
an attempt to answer some of these questions, the United States
Department of Transportation (DOT) published a monograph pre-
pared by Waller and Klein, who have attacked the belief that "since
the driver is responsible for crashes, changing his behavior will
reduce the number of crashes."13 Aiming to undermine the concept
of personal responsibility, 4 these experts drew analogies to the
status-laden medical sciences, overlooking the inherent differences
* This article is an adaptation from the following works of Dr. Mancuso, completed in
cooperation with the Defense Research Institute, Milwaukee, Wisconsin: J. MANCUSO, THE
CONCEPT OF CULPABILITY: ITS UTILITY IN PROMOTING PROPER ROADWAY USE, 1971 DRI
Special Report No. 8, May, 1971; Mancuso, Fault-A Basic Requisite of Sound Public
Policy, 38 INS. COUNSEL J. 397 (1971).
** Associate Professor of Psychology, State University of New York-Albany.
1. In a relatively recent publication, Lewis Mumford called attention to the presence, in
modem industrial technology, of the machine's tyranny, threatening our society. The auto-
mobile clearly is a symbol of this tyranny. L. MUMFORD II, THE MYTH OF THE MACHINE
(1970).
2. Underscoring the grip which the automobile holds on our lives, it is interesting to note
that a national organization of state highway officials has estimated that the expenditure of
$320 billion will be required during the next fifteen years to meet American highway needs.
Wicker, The Highway Juggernaut, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1971, § E, at 15.
3. D. KLEIN & J. WALLER, CAUSATION, CULPABILITY AND DETERRENCE IN HIGHWAY
CRASHES (1970) [hereinafter cited as D.O.T. MONOGRAPH].
4. Demonstrating this intent, these analysts have written:
Although the moralistic view has largely disappeared in modem medicine and public
health, it still prevails in many areas of highway safety. As we shall note in subsequent
pages, police, insurance companies, and administrative authorities attribute the vast
majority of crashes to "carelessness," "negligence," and other avoidable human
behavior despite increasing indications that these concepts are neither meaningful nor
useful.
Id. at 12.
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between that discipline and the study of behavior. Whereas medi-
cine can justly ignore the causal connections between disease and
individual culpability, the science of moral behavior, by its very
definition, cannot ignore the concept of personal fault. While these
experts have presented one possible set of conclusions concerning
norm-violation on the public roadways, they, like all behavioral
scientists, had to work within the thin body of theory currently
available to explain behavior. Using this very same body of avail-
able theory, Lawrence Lawton, a widely-known specialist in the
area of traffic-safety research and accident reconstruction, reached
an opposte conclusion-that the current system of personal fault,
coupled with our system of legal tort procedures, does promote
proper roadway behavior.
Prefatory to any discussion of moral behavior in the automo-
tive transportation system and the problem of whether the concept
of fault should be retained, it is essential that the reader be made
aware of the theories which have dominated recent psychological
thought concerning moral behavioral development. While rarely
used in pure form, three broad theories can, for our purposes, be
said to exist-(l) the impulse control theory, (2) the habit-reward
theory, and (3) the moral judgment theory-each of which we shall
consider in some detail.
I. PRESENTLY EXISTING THEORIES
A. Impulse Control Theory
Under the impulse control theory, it is assumed that unaccepta-
ble moral behaviors derive from the inborn, primitive response
repertory of every human being. Such unacceptable behavior we
delineate as "evil." With the development of Freud's psychoanaly-
tic theory, the notions of man as being impelled by evil took on a
special biological characteristic. Freud promoted the argument
that the impulses which generated anti-social behavior were the
human heritage of evolution. Certain biological characteristics of
the human organism assured that people would engage in behaviors
opposed to sound social order. These behaviors, while anti-social,
preserved the person as a biological specimen and as a member of
a surviving and successful species. When man engaged in harmful
aggression, rampant sexuality, and self-centered greed, behavior
analysts-particularly those highly-paid specialists known as psy-
choanalysts-traced the anti-social behavior to basic impulses.
Within this paradigm, man is considered a biological organism
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whose existence depends upon his repetitive involvement in behav-
iors that disrupt sound social functioning.
These disruptive impulses are controlled through socialization
processes. The family and other social institutions discipline most
persons to harness their impulses and divert their energies into
socially favored behaviors. But for these processes, this theory
argues, behavior would be dominated completely by biologically
driven impulse expression. Social order would break down as each
of us pursued our own impulse satisfactions.
Thus, viewing unacceptable behaviors as the expression of im-
pulses, a theorist could regard automobile mishaps, likewise, as
expressions of impulses. In its most simple form, this theory is
reflected in the advice of safety organizations which counsel us not
to drive when we are angry, as the basic impulse of anger could be
diverted so that we "unconsciously" drive with the aim of injuring
someone-the victim, of course, being a substitute for the person
who frustrated our initial impulse.
The impulse expression theory, like other theories of moral
behavior, has been the model for study of the behavior of drivers.
For example, one study of drivers involved in fatal automobile
mishaps revealed a relationship between lack of impulse control
and accidents. Of the 96 drivers involved in fatal accidents, nine
were found to be suicidal, as compared to one driver being so
classified in the control group. Fifteen of the so-called "fatal"
drivers were judged to be violent (having engaged in more than one
unprovoked physical fight after age eighteen), as compared to nine
in the control group so judged.5 From these findings, the inference
arises that "fatal" drivers do not have proper impulse control.
Another study, undertaken for purposes of explaining the re-
peatedly higher incidence of automobile mishaps reported among
younger drivers, likewise supports the conclusion that auto mis-
management is directly attributable to impulse expression. Approx-
imately sixty percent of the subjects who had a high record of
traffic-violation arrests were impulse motivated. Youths who were
classified as being high in impulse expression reported that they had
driven to "blow off steam" after arguments with family or girl
friend, or that they had become angry at obstacles such as red
lights, pedestrians, and slow traffic.6 This data led the analysts
5. Seizer, Alcoholism, Medical Illness, and Stress in 96 Drivers Causing Fatal
Accidents, 14 BEHAVIORAL SCI. 1 (1969).
6. Schuman, Pelz, Ehrlich & Seizer, Young Male Drivers, 200 J.A.M.A. 1026 (1967).
1972]
MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
conducting the study to conclude that "emotional factors involving
use of the automobile as an expressive instrument were important
in accidents and, particularly, in moving accidents." '7
The impulse control theory virtually eliminates the concept of
personal culpability from considerations of moral behavior. An
individual's unacceptable behavior is attributed to (1) the way in
which his "unconscious mind" manipulates his "real self" to allow
impulse expression, or (2) poor socialization training by parents.
The norm-violator is "mentally ill" and, thus, cannot be held ac-
countable for his behavior.
A study of the literature which discusses mishaps on our public
highways reveals that writers who invoke the impulse theory have,
at some time, been associated with the medical profession. Freud,
who gave this theory its sharpest impetus, sought to explain unu-
sual behaviors by working within a tradition which encouraged
classification of "patients" into disease groupings. It is, thus, un-
derstandable that investigators in the Freudian tradition have at-
tempted to describe the "type" of person who repeatedly engages
in unacceptable driving behavior-that individual more popularly
known as the "accident-prone person." 8 While Klein and Waller,
perhaps inadvertently, slip into use of the impulse theory,9 they do
recognize the need for caution in applying typology notions to
7. Id. at 1030.
8. Following the model derived from medicine, one team of investigators described the
"accident-prone" driver as a "mild psychopathic" personality and attributed to him a
higher incidence of the following characteristics than is present in those in a low-accident
group:
(a) An early life marked by parental disharmony;
(b) Childhood disrespect for organized authority;
(c) Difficulty with school authorities and legal agencies;
(d) Frequent changing of short-lived jobs;
(e) A non-traffic-connected police record;
(f) A general disregard for social propriety;
(g) Professional acquaintance with social service agencies;
(h) Emphasis on material values and immediate satisfactions;
(i) Driving marked by aggressiveness, impulsiveness, and inconsideration of others.
Tillman & Hobbs, The Accident-Prone Automobile Driver, 106 AM. J. PSYCH. 321, 322
(1949).
9. Evidencing their reliance upon impulse theory, Klein and Waller speak of "an emo-
tional outlet:"
More specifically, the automobile offers him (the young driver) a degree of autonomy
and social equality which he cannot enjoy otherwise because of his sub-adult status.
The more severely he is restricted in these resptects, the more likely he is to use the
automobile as a compensatory mechanism and an emotional outlet.
D.O.T. MONOGRAPH at 86.
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vehicle mismanagement.10 And, wise caution is doubly demanded
when using this theory to establish social policy.
Particularly is such caution required in light of the questionable
status of the impulse-control theory. Despite its attractiveness, can
one readily accept a postulate which defines man as a biological
organism impulsively driven to engage in evil behaviors? An even
more serious objection to impulse theory, from a scientific point of
view, arises from the fact that it defines "impulse" in terms of
"unconscious" action. The value of an unconscious process to the
behavior analyst originates in its nonobservability-the very qual-
ity which precludes a testing of its existence in fact. Further, from
an empirical level, impulse theory is unsatisfactory in light of the
fact that humans do not necessarily pursue life-preserving gratifica-
tions, as the theory dictates. People, seeking to protect others, will
endanger their own lives; a young man, responding to challenges
to his masculinity, will drive his automobile dangerously.
Thus, we see, the impulse control theory, upon close analysis,
does not appear to be most adequate for purposes of assessing our
highway problems. Characteristic of their work, Klein and Wailer,
in their DOT-sponsored work, present no evaluation of the ade-
quacy of the theory which results in one's speaking in terms of
"impulse-ridden" persons. They can achieve their goal of down-
grading the concept of culpability by the simple device of demon-
strating the infeasibility of sorting out and restricting the "accident
prone" person from highway use.
B. The Habit-Reward Theory
Under the habit-reward theory, it is believed that learners are
induced to perform acceptable behaviors and to refrain from per-
formance of those which are unacceptable as a result of the applica-
tion of a system of rewards and punishments. Deterrent or punitive
counter-measures seek to reduce undesirable behaviors by associat-
ing them with unpleasant experiences, or punishment. This associa-
tion supposedly prevents recurrence of the undesirable behavior. On
10. As these analysts concluded:
Carefully designed and excecuted research has shown that it is possible to identify
groups of drivers and pedestrians with differing crash risk. The problem is that in
most cases officially collected highway data are not yet sufficiently accurate (and in
some cases cannot even theoretically become sufficiently accurate) to permit direct
application of the research knowledge without substantial inequities and injustices to
individuals.
Id. at 91.
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the other hand, reward associationist principles are applied in an
attempt to increase acceptable behaviors. This approach, then, as-
sumes a causative relationship between reward or punishment and
desirable or undesirable behaviors. For example, educators assume
that skill in managing an automobile can be increased through a
driving course, with the net effect being that of reducing the incid-
ence of accidents. The practice of "motivating" -students to raise
their skill level by threats of poor grades follows from the implicit
assumption that behavior can be regulated through a judicious
dispensation of positively- and negatively-valued "motivators."
Derived from an established "wisdom of the market place," the
habit-reward theory, having enjoyed centuries of application, repre-
sents a practical approach to behavioral development. Children
learn and implicitly believe the principle that one can promote a
behavior in another by causing him to feel pleasant when desired
behavior is completed. To discourage undesirable behavior, an
actor need only be put into an unpleasant state after manifesting
that behavior.
Personal responsibility under the habit-reward theory is treated
much the same as under the impulse-control theory. Habit-reward
theorists, generally taking a position of "hard determinism," con-
sider a person's behavior to be determined by the amount and
nature of the reward he has attained." The individual has no choice
of actions; rather, the actions he takes are determined by his history
of rewards and punishments. Because only the person in control or
power is allowed to choose when to administer rewards and punish-
ment, the ordinary person cannot be responsible for the behaviors
which have been "programmed" into him.
However, we can step back in the process to question the culpa-
bility of the programmer. Why did he choose to reward a particular
behavior and punish another? How shall we evaluate, for example,
the culpability of the auto manufacturer who suggests that driving
his over-powered car will put a beautiful blonde into the seat next
to the lucky buyer? Furthermore, the whole chain of argument
which eliminates personal fault within the habit-reward theory is
dependent upon the linking assumption that reward and punish-
ment, in themselves, do affect behavior and that the environment
controls all forms of reward. If this assumption is valid, a behavior
analyst could use the habit-reward theory as a basis for recom-
11. J. RYCHLAK, A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE FOR PERSONALITY (1968).
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mending elimination of the fault concept from questions of moral
behavior.
Analyzing this theory in their DOT-sponsored work, Klein and
Waller imply that the main reason for determining culpability is
to administer punishment. Focusing upon the role of punishment
as a deterrent to vehicular mishaps, this team determined its effec-
tiveness to be dependent upon:
1. The likelihood of. . .being apprehended for the deviant
act.
2. The likelihood of punishment if apprehended.
3. The severity of the punishment.
4. The attractiveness of the deviant behavior.
5. The availability of alternative behavior.
6. The absence of other considerations which are unrelated
to the deterrent measure but which act to inhibit the deviant
behavior.2
Assuming that for a deterrent measure to be effective, "punishment
must follow apprehension with reasonable certainty and prompt-
ness" 13 and arguing that this is not present in current regulation,
Klein and Waller conclude that these factors cannot be effectively
controlled to lower the current rates of automobile mishaps. In
their opinion, tort procedures, which they view as a prelude to
punishment, do not deter norm-violation.14
The problem with the Klein-Waller approach is that, having
argued (successfully or not) that punishment is ineffectual, they
conclude that the establishment of culpability is not an effective
deterrent to roadway mishaps. Does this conclusion necessarily
follow the argument upon which it is based? Because punishment
and the establishment of personal fault are two separate variables,
their effect must be analyzed separately.
12. D.O.T. MONOGRAPH at 13.4-135.
13. Id. at 136.
14. In the words of Klein and Waller:
As for the fear of punishment through the tort system, there is neither evidence nor
logical reason to support the notion that this'constitutes a major deterrent. Insured
drivers (by far the majority of all drivers) believe that their insurance premiums buy
them substantial protection against this. The uninsured driver has not been carefully
studied, but there is some reason to believe that he is as unperceptive about the
possibility of a negligence suit as he is about the consequences of many of his other
actions. And despite the Lawton review of the literature, ...there is good reason
to believe that the "punishment" most feared by most drivers is the injury they are
likely to incur if they precipitate a crash.
D.O.T. MONOGRAPH at 137.
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Similar to its handling of the impulse control theory, the Klein-
Waller DOT monograph includes no analysis of the habit-reward
theory from which these writers derive the factors they assume to
be effective in inhibiting unacceptable behavior. For example, we
cannot be sure that they would be prepared to conclude that punish-
ment, in itself, is not a variable in behavioral control. Although
they list punishment variables as factors, Klein and Waller later
point out that behavioral scientists no longer maintain rigid faith
in the efficacy of punishment as a modifier of behavior. Is this loss
of faith an implicit recognition that the habit-reward theory should
be supplanted? Or is it a direct recognition that the role of punish-
ment has been misunderstood, even though it still must be consid-
ered a primary variable? Either conclusion could follow from Klein
and Waller's account.
The habit-reward theory presents a series of inexplicable puz-
zles. First, people persist in performing certain behaviors despite
punishment. This problem is considered by Waller and Klein in
their discussion of the "won't-conform" driver-a person unde-
terred from unlawful, anti-social behavior by "threats that might
deter the law-abiding citizen."' 5 Espousing the weakly supported
proposition that these persons are biologically different than the
average citizen, another writer has developed a total theory that
certain criminal persons are resistant to the usual habit-reward
system of moral behavior training. 6 Rather than seek a theoretical
principle to explain the resistance to punishment by the "won't-
conform" group, Klein and Waller, referring to another study, 7
propose that family influence has a strong effect upon the moral
behavior of drivers. Because they have failed to explain why punish-
ment has proved ineffective with this group or determine whether
a study of family influences, rather than punishment principles,
would lead to a better understanding of control over roadway use,
a student of the problem is left with little basis from which to draw
conclusions about the effectiveness of punishment.
A second major criticism of the habit-reward explanation of
moral behavior concerns the generalizations involved in training a
person to engage in acceptable behaviors and avoid those which
violate societal standards. Will the sufficient rewarding of "pro-
15. Id. at 132.
16. H. EYSENCK, CRIME AND PERSONALITY (1964).
17. Carlson & Klein, Familial vs. Institutional Socialization of the Young Traffic
Offender, 2 J. OF SAFETY RESEARCH 13 (1970).
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per" driving skills in a classroom situation, for example, guarantee
that these driving skills will generalize to road and highway vehicle
management? Or, to turn attention to the punishment aspects of
the theory, will a driver who has been punished for exceeding the
speed limit by traveling 50 miles-per-hour in a 30 mile-per-hour
zone generalize the punishment to speeding behavior in 65 mile-per-
hour zones? This problem becomes more perplexing when we con-
sider whether the rewards for appropriate behavior in one situation
(e.g., proceeding very slowly on an icy roadway) generalize to ap-
propriate behaviors in somewhat remote situations (e.g., monitor-
ing mirrors while overtaking and passing other vehicles). When one
"proper" behavior is strengthened, are all "proper" behaviors
strengthened? We know that it is impossible to develop automobile-
management training programs which would both reward every
conceivable type of acceptable driving behavior and punish every
possible type of unacceptable driving behavior. Because the habit-
reward theory does seek to treat a principle of generalization as
valid, leaving many questions related to this principle unanswered,
its credibility appears somewhat impeached.
C. The Moral Judgment Theory
Focusing upon principles which explain how a person adopts a
general internalized standard to guide his behavior in events which
cut across a wide variety of specific behaviors, the moral judgment
theory emphasizes the role of individual thinking processes in per-
sonal moral-behavior development. This approach recognizes the
need to explain the fact that people behave acceptably even though
they have never been instructed to so behave in that particular
situation. Reflected in this theory's very title is its basic assumption
that a person is able to judge that a moral act is "good" or "bad"
by applying internalized values, through a process identical to that
used in judging whether something is "near" or "far."
Under this theory, certain features are considered to character-
ize the child's moral behavior development. First, the child is
deemed to progress from a belief that proper moral behaviors are
determined by authoritarian constraint toward a belief that pro-
priety is determined by the necessity of social cooperation. For
example, a child under seven years of age believes a lie is "bad"
because an adult punishes those who lie; only later does he recog-
nize that a lie undermines the trust and reciprocal respect required
for satisfactory social relations. Secondly, the child is considered
as progressing from a belief that "rules" are immutable, universal,
1972]
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and indelibly recorded to a recognition that those rules can change
to meet the requirements of the social situation. Thirdly, the child
is considered to change his views on justice as he progresses in his
thinking about moral behaviors. In the earlier phases of his devel-
opment, a child views justice as a matter of meting out punishment,
which must quantitively balance the crime as an expiation of the
"evil" associated with the transgression. The immature child is,
thus, a habit-reward theorist, believing that the power to punish is
the source of the power to determine propriety. "Fault" to him is
a matter of angering authority rather than a matter of violating a
mutually agreed-upon ordering of social interaction. When he de-
velops to the point where he recognizes that "good" moral behav-
ior represents an effort to facilitate social interaction, the child
tends to view justice as an effort to make the transgressor clearly
aware of the nature of his offense.
Application of this theory requires recognition of certain princi-
ples, the first being that social groups, rather than "universal
forces," establish the "goodness" or "badness" of an act.
Whereas the young child cannot conceive of the relativity of moral
judgments, as he matures psychologically he acquires the ability to
realize that rules emanate from a desire to facilitate social interac-
tions and that social discussion is a necessary condition precedent
to the establishment of those rules. The moral judgment theorist,
in analyzing the morality of vehicle management, must always
recognize this principle. Secondly, he must recognize the psychol-
ogical incorporation by the individual of the judgment scale, from
goodness to badness. Because a child is not born with inherent
knowledge as to what constitutes "good" or "bad" acts, he must
learn that events can be construed along a judgment scale. Thirdly,
the moral judgment theorist must recognize that a person must also
learn which acts society deems to be at the "good" end of the scale
and which it deems to be at the opposte end.' 8 Fourthly, it must be
recognized that a child must be cognitively mature before he can
18. In illustrating this third principle, Lawton effectively turned to social psychology,
showing how groups influence an individual to perceive events in ways that are considered
"good." In his systems-analysis evaluation of the effectiveness of tort procedures as a
deterrent to improper roadway behavior, Lawton maintained that an individual's behavior
is influenced by group pressure and that the intensity of this influence is a direct function of
both the number and degree of contacts between the individual and the group. He has further
maintained that this intensity increases when the individual is singled out by the group. L.
LAWTON, PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE FAULT SYSTEM AS COMPARED WITH THE No-
FAULT SYSTEM OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 26, 27 (1969).
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be taught that "good" moral judgments are those which consider
the well-being of others.
Within the moral judgment theory, public determination of per-
sonal "fault" is highly important. According to this theory, the
mature person recognizes that "proper" moral behavior requires
a consideration of other people's perceptions. From mutual consid-
eration of each other's positions, people derive a "social contract"
which is violated by an improper act. Consequently, this theory
demands the retention of the fault concept. In an ordered society,
everyone must learn that goodness is determined in concert with
others and that when rules are agreed upon, a breach of the social
contract represents a most serious transgression. When he violates
the rules, a properly socialized person must feel culpable-that is,
he must feel guilt.
During the last decade, more and more psychologists have
adopted this explanation of moral behavior development-a condi-
tion wherein a child develops his judgment process.' 9 A rapidly-
growing number of studies attest to the high utility of the judgment
paradigm.2 0 However, little actual use of it has been made. Al-
though modern educators look to its further expansion and use in
school programs, this theory has been seldom applied in establish-
ing social policy.21 Lawton's work excluded, no systematic study of
the moral behavior of automobile drivers has utilized this model.
The extended discussion of culpability in roadway mishaps by
Klein and Waller contains no references which would reveal an
awareness on their part of the utility of applying judgment theory
to morality of auto management.
The value of this theory in the area of driver behavior lies in its
ability to explain questions left unanswered under the impulse-
control and habit-reward theories. Consider the following illustra-
19. See J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1965); Kohlberg, The Devel-
opment of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order: L Sequence in the Development
of Moral Thought, 6 VITA HUMANA 11 (1963); Kohlberg & Kramer, Continuities and
Discontinuities in Children and Adult Moral Development, 12 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 93
(1969).
20. See T. LICKONA, THE ACCELERATION OF CHILDREN'S JUDGMENTS ABOUT
RESPONSIBILITY (1971); Kohlberg & Kramer, supra note 19; Pittel and Mendelsohn,
Measurement of Moral Values: A Review and Critique, 66 PSYCH. BULL. 22 (1965); Rest,
Turiel & Kohlberg, Level of Moral Development as a Determinant of Performance and
Comprehension of Moral Judgments Made by Others, 37 J. OF PERSONALITY 225 (1969);
Stuart, Decentration in the Development of Children's Concepts of Moral and Causal
Judgments, 11 J. OF GENETIC PSYCH. 59 (1967).
21. Kohlberg, supra note 19.
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tion: A young man, driving on his first extended trip in the north-
east, encounters a snow storm. Approaching a winding, down-hill
portion of the road, he slows his car, downshifts into second gear,
and proceeds. A short distance onward, he approaches a straight-
away and shifts into third gear. What accounts for this young
man's behavior? Here, in situations wherein he has never previously
been punished or rewarded, be behaves in ways which society would
judge as "good." Perhaps he has developed a fear of being injured.
Both the habit-reward theorist and the impulse-control theorist
could speak of self-preservation as the motivating factor. However,
taking our example further, this very same man drives his auto in
high-speed races, wherein he is very aggressive. Although he has
seen other drivers killed or severely injured, he does not, in racing,
hesitate to maneuver his car in ways that indicate a willingness to
force a competitor into a collision, if necessary, to prevent being
overtaken. These examples, showing caution in one dangerous situ-
ation and courting danger in another confound the theorist who
would say that cautious driving is motivated by fear of punishment
(i.e., personal injury). The moral judgment theory, however, has no
difficulty explaining these differences. According to him, the driver
in our example has developed a standard which forces him to view
"good" moral behavior in terms of the viewpoints of others and
to consider the well-being of those with whom he interacts. When
he is on a public, slippery roadway, he gauges his behavior so that
others, as well as himself, are protected. On a-raceway, on the other
hand, he is aware that other racers anticipate his "dangerous"
behavior and that they willingly submit to possible consequences.
Knowing the viewpoints of the others and the dangers involved, he
drives his automobile to win the race.
The major drawback of the judgment theory stems from the
lack of its prior application to vehicle-management behavior. Fur-
ther, from a scientific standpoint, the perennial issue of the privacy
of the psychological process stands as an obstacle to its ready
application. How does an investigator establish whether or not a
subject understands the social use of the "good-bad" judgment
scale? Does a subject accept the moral propriety of considering the
well-being of others with whom he interacts? Since his judgments
are private, how can we measure where he places an event on his
personal "good-bad" scale? However, unlike the impulse theorist,
who postulates a "clever other mind" bent on guarding privacy,
the moral judgment theorist can devise techniques to bring a sub-
ject's processes into public view. Assuming that one judgment is
[Vol. 55
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psychologically similar to any other judgment, the judgment theor-
ist can divert some of his attention to the task of publicizing all
judgment processes. Taking this issue of privacy into account, judg-
ment theory seriously attempts to base its principles on public
events.
22
II. WHICH THEORY SHOULD WE APPLY?
The policy maker, seeking to understand moral behavior, func-
tions best when he is cautious. When policy is implemented on the
basis of a particular theory, its results are best evaluated in terms
of that theory. Should desirable occurrences follow the application
of a particular set of procedures, we must be certain these events
are, indeed, the results of the applied procedures. Likewise, if the
established policy is unsuccessful, an investigator must assess, care-
fully, the factors contributing to the final outcome. Since moral
behavior has a short history of careful scientific scrutiny, it would
be unwise to jettison ages of practice on the basis of the weakly-
founded principles used by psychologists in their scientific activity.
The preceding review of theories of moral behavior leads to the
conclusion that behavioral scientists must assume humility when
they offer advice to policy makers. When theories utilized cannot
be fully explained and tend to lead to contradictory conclusions,
there is certainly need to be highly cautious about radical revision
of existing policy.
Public approaches toward influencing moral behaviors appear
to have employed a crude form of the habit-reward the6ry. Legisla-
tive and judicial systems appear to have threatened punishment to
those who have acted unacceptably, while promising reward to
those who act acceptably. Laws regulating roadway use and vehicle
management prescribe fines and other sanctions against violators.
Yet, there is little evidence that people are induced to regulate their
moral behaviors in terms of rewards and punishments. In fact, one
writer has presented data which indicates that unacceptable behav-
iors actually rise in number when transgressors are sentenced to
harsh punishments23 As already noted, Klein and Waller effectively
argue that punishment has been ineffective in deterring sizeable
portions of traffic violations. While proposing necessary cautions
about postulating the existence of a "traffic-violator type," Waller
22. READINGS FOR A COGNITIVE THEORY OF PERSONALITY (J. Mancuso ed. 1970).
23. Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 284 ANNALS 8 (1952).
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and Klein nevertheless advocate the recognition of a "won't-
conform" group of auto drivers, who apparently are "punishment
resistant. '"' This, certainly, corresponds to the observation that
most persons who are incarcerated in prisons have been there be-
fore or will return there again. Because it does not appear to be an
effective social-control mechanism, punishment, in itself, cannot be
advised as a means of encouraging people to manage their automo-
biles in manners that consider the well-being of other roadway
users.
Frequently in published articles there appears the recommenda-
tion that roadway safety can be increased by decreasing public
exposure to "violator types." This recommendation is based on the
faulty assumptions that there are individuals who can be readily
identified as "unsafe" drivers and that there exists a practical,
constitutional means of eliminating these types from our highways,
when, in fact, no suitable criteria for reliabily including persons in
one or another category has, as yet, been established. Investigators
have shown that the use of selection tests to separate the "safe"
from the "unsafe" drivers is highly inefficient. 25 To eliminate a
large portion of "unsafe" drivers, it would be necessary to also
eliminate huge percentages of people who would be totally "safe"
drivers were they allowed to drive. Further, use of these tests would
not eliminate the high percentage of vehicular mishaps caused by
one-time transgressors.
The studies, arguments, and conclusions reviewed to this point
accentuate the sense of failure in social policies used to control the
behavior of roadway users and the shortcomings of available theo-
ries of moral behavior. This sense of failure might invite hasty and
radical changes in social policy without careful analysis of those
parts of the policy that have failed. We must be certain that we are
not judging the failure of the policy in terms of a theory that is
simply inapplicable. We must be alert to the possibility that a
policy change may encourage less mature forms of moral behavior.
A prime example of such change is represented by "no-fault"
insurance plans which would eliminate tort procedures for liability
cases arising out of vehicular mishaps. The recommendation of
Klein and Waller that the concept of culpability be de-emphasized
can be viewed as the result of their application of an ineffective
24. D.O.T. MONOGRAPH at 132-34.
25. LNlaner & Drucker, Selection Tests-A Dubious Aid in Driver Licensing, HIGH-
WAY KMESARCH RECORD, Pub. No. 84 (1965).
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theory to analyze moral behavior within the transportation system.
While Klein and Waller turn their professional scorn on Lawton,
suggesting a fallacy in his interpretation of scientific studies, they
simultaneously reflect a narrow approach to theories of moral be-
havior. To illustrate, they persist in using the habit-reward theory,
referring to tort procedures as "punishment." Then, believing they
have demonstrated the ineffectiveness of punishment as a deterrent,
they suggest that tort procedures do not function as a positive
influence on the moral behavior of drivers. A wider view of moral
behavior theory allows the conclusion that tort procedures have a
pronounced effect upon moral behavior in auto management, par-
ticularly upon application of the judgment theory. As we previously
noted, under this theory one must learn that he is expected to
consider the well-being of those with whom he interacts. While it
is possible to view court action against a traffic violator as "pun-
ishment," it can also be perceived as a justice process, whereby a
social group determines the reasons why the accused norm-violator
should be informed of his personal culpability. One need not per-
ceive a court proceeding within the confines of the crude habit-
reward theory. Rather, one can view society, acting through its
legal institutions, as a teacher of the premise that moral judgments
must consider the well-being of others.
We cannot ignore the fact that a tort procedure represents a
unique legal device, wherein individuals face each other as they seek
to determine culpability. Reflecting a more mature stage of moral
development, the person involved in this process becomes aware of
the premise that mutual facilitation of social interaction is the
source of the soundest social rules. Here the aggrieved party, rather
than a dominating authority, questions the propriety of a possible
offender's acts. In light of these factors, would it not be theoreti-
cally justifiable to extend, rather than limit, the use of tort proce-
dures? While a social planner could concur in Klein and Waller's
assertions regarding the role of vehicular and highway defects in
accident causation, would it not be advisable to encourage the
institution of court procedures designed to establish the culpability
of automobile manufacturers and highway engineers? Indeed, as
the development of products liability law indicates, people have
begun to realize that inasmuch as they pay for a safe vehicle when
they purchase a car, someone should be charged with the responsi-
bility of providing that safety.
Klein and Waller have expressed confidence in the effectiveness
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of public educational forums as a teacher of reckless behavior .2
Why, then, should they not be just as willing to concede that so-
ciety, likewise, teaches positive attitudes, leading to crash-avoiding
behavior, through institutions, such as courts, which promote pub-
lic discussion of culpability? Why not believe that it is such instruc-
tion, rather than punishment or fear thereof, which induces millions
of people to respect the well-being of others while using the
highways?
Unlike any other theory of moral behavior, the judgment theory
recognizes the role of the courts as instructor of proper actions.
Likewise, judgment theory alone can explain certain types of be-
havior. For example, unlike any other major theory, it can account
for the alcoholic driver other than in terms of impulse. The person
who uses alcohol in excessive amounts is merely recognized as one
who cannot maintain social relationships in which people consider
each other's well-being. Having learned that the use of alcohol
interferes with social interactions, the alcoholic's inability to limit
his drinking indicates a lack of commitment to the rule of social
reciprocity. A behavior analyst can predict, therefore, that such a
person would not consider the well-being of others in any of his
moral judgments, whether they involve driving an automobile, pro-
viding money for the support of his children, or controlling aggres-
sion. In addition, judgment theory can account for data showing
that familial influence strongly affects the moral behavior of driv-
ing, just as it affects moral behavior in general.27 For example,
middle class families are recognized as inducing better driving prac-
tices in their children because they encourage them to think of
moral behavior in terms of facilitating social interaction. 2 Conse-
quently, middle-class children tend to be more successful in driver
education courses-the result of their pre-training in the develop-
ment of attitudes which direct the making of driving judgments in
terms of the well-being of others .29
26. Demonstrating this confidence, these writers, in describing the young driver, have
written:
In common with all members of the society, he learns early and often from literature,
from films, from history books, from advertising and all the other mass media-that
daring, risk taking, excitement, and tension are all desirable and attractive.
D.O.T. MONOGRAPH at 202.
27. MacRae, A List of Piaget's Theory of Moral Development, 49 J. OF ABNORM. AND
SOC. PSYCH. 14 (1954); Hoffman & Saltzstein, Parental Discipline and the Child's Moral
Development, 5 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 45 (1967).
28. Boehm, The Development of Conscience: A Comparison of American Children of
Different Mental and Socioeconomic Levels, 33 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 575 (1962).
29. F. McGuIRE & R. KERCH, AN EVALUATION OF DRIVER EDUCATION (1969).
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III. CONCLUSION
Considerations emanating from analysis of theories of moral
development, in conjunction with the promise that a more refined
theory can emerge in the near future, warn policy makers against
clinging to any particular behavioral theory at the present time.
Within the last decade, behavioral scientists have increasingly
turned to judgment theory to explain moral behavioral develop-
ment. This theory, particularly when coupled with the fund of data
and thought which defines the nature of social influence on cogni-
tion and judgment, promises to give a broader understanding of the
means through which a society can induce its members to give
primary attention to the well-being of all participating members of
the society. But this theory, too, is years away from final formula-
tion. This state of affairs leads to a strong awareness of the need
for cautioning against the implementation of radical changes of
well-practiced, tradition-proved social policies. Particularly is such
caution needed in the area of insurance law. Adoption of a no-fault
system of insurance, wherein individuals would be automatically
absolved from charges of culpability, cannot be allowed to occur
on the basis of unrefined theory. In light of the emergence of judg-
ment theory, with its emphasis upon the need for tort procedures
as a teacher of proper social interaction, should we not, at this
stage, refrain from taking politically expedient steps which, in the
long run, may prove disastrous in terms of the moral structuring
of society?
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